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I. Introduction

It is widely believed that the tax base in most developing countries
has been severely eroded by legal tax avoidance and illegal tax eva

sion, brought about largely by poor' tax administration.1 This erosion
it is thought, has had a variety of fiscal effects: tax revenues are lost
and the growth of the tax base is dampened, the progressivity implie
by the statutory rate structure is not achieved, the costs of tax adminis-

tration are increased, and horizontal and vertical equity suffer becaus
the effective tax rates faced by individuals depend largely upon their
success in playing the tax compliance game. It is not surprising, therefore, that virtually all fiscal reform programs in developing countrie
start with the promise to improve administration. Better administration

is a discretionary government action that at once can lower the tax
rate, increase revenues, slow capital flight, and improve the fairness
of the system. Yet tax base erosion in developing countries is something about which precious little is known, and, in particular, the em
pirical evidence about the severity and the nature of the problem is al
but nonexistent.2

Why do we know so little about the dimensions of the evasionavoidance problem? One reason is conceptual problems in measuring
erosion of the tax base. For example, how does one estimate the substitution of nontaxable for taxable compensation in response to the tax
structure, or the extent to which a higher marginal tax rate has induced

individuals to report less of their taxable income? Another reason is
the problem of comparability across countries. The many legal and
? 1991 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
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illegal channels by which individuals can reduce their taxes d
upon the institutions of a country. The comparability problem
ther compounded by the importance of cultural factors in defi
line between compliance and noncompliance. Finally, and most
tant, little of the relevant data to estimate the full tax base a
able. Most governments in developing countries find it difficul
to gather complete data on those who do pay taxes; they mak
systematic attempt to collect information on those who do n
taxes. Further, most of the information that is collected on e
has come as a result of campaigns to gain a quick revenue fix
than to estimate the gap between the statutory and the compr
tax base. Such information is therefore not comprehensive a
is not reported other than in internal government documents.
The purpose of this article is to demonstrate a set of meth

which micro-level estimates of the amount of income that
individual income taxation via both legal and illegal means can be
generated and utilized.3 The country that is examined as a case study
is Jamaica, and the estimates presented here were used by the government in its 1986 tax reform program. In fact, it is doubtful that the
sweeping reform of the income tax could have occurred in the absence
of rigorous statistical analysis of alternative rate and base combinations, which was only made possible by the existence of detailed individual information on the potential tax base. The individual income
tax reform of 1986 replaced the existing structure with a simpler, flatrate tax of 33'/3% on an expanded definition of income. The data discussed in this article were generated as part of our work on the tax
reform project for the government of Jamaica and are based on the
prereform system.

Estimates of the various types of taxed and untaxed income for
1983 are calculated using several unique sources of information on
income recipients in Jamaica. These estimates are used to construct a
measure of comprehensive income for each individual, and this expanded measure of income is then used to estimate the incidence of
taxes actually paid relative to comprehensive income, as well as the
amount and the distribution of taxes that were not collected. To our

knowledge, these estimates represent the first time such micro-leve
measures of erosion have been calculated and analyzed.
The results indicate that there is enormous erosion of the income

tax base in Jamaica. Failure to tax comprehensive income has seriously compromised the statutory goals of the tax: it has led to a large
reduction in the progressivity of the tax, it has introduced horizontal
inequities, and it has cost an amount in revenues equivalent to about
84% of actual collections. Although these results are specific to Jamaica, it is likely that similar conclusions hold for other developing

countries.
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Section II describes the Jamaican incom
of base erosion are discussed and derived in Section III. The revenue

and distributional effects of base erosion are analyzed in Section IV.
Section V compares our micro estimates with those from a simpler,
more aggregate method. Section VI summarizes the main results and
discusses the implications of these results and the applicability of the
measurement methods for other developing countries.
II. Individual Income Taxation in Jamaica

The individual income tax is the largest single revenue source for the
government of Jamaica, with revenues in 1983 totaling J$416.3 million.4

This represents 28.9% of all government revenues and 7.6% of national
income. It is also one of its most unpopular taxes. Two types of individuals pay the income tax: those with income only from wages and
salaries, and those with income from any source in addition to wages
and salaries (interest, rent, dividends, and the like). The first group of
taxpayers has taxes withheld by the employer under the Pay-As-YouEarn (PAYE) system, and these individuals are not required to file an
income tax return unless some error was made in withholding. Over
90% of income tax revenues are collected by employer withholding

under the PAYE system. The second type of income recipient, to
whom we refer as the "self-employed," also has PAYE taxes withheld
on wage income, if any such income is earned and if the employer is
registered. In addition, as long as these individuals have other sources
of income, each must file a return upon which taxes on other income
are paid.
In theory, the Jamaican individual income tax prior to reform was
broad based, with only interest income exempt, and the rate structure
was high and steeply progressive, rising from a marginal tax rate of
30% on the first J$7,000 of taxable (or "statutory") income to 57.5%
on all income above J$14,000.5 In practice, the base and progressivity
of the income tax were reduced by an extensive system of tax credits,
a number of loopholes that permitted legal tax avoidance, and widespread tax evasion: (a) An individual's tax liability could be reduced
to zero by the application of up to 16 tax credits of various amounts,
for purposes such as personal and child credits, alimony, medical expenditures, employment of household helpers, and participation in savings and life insurance programs. (b) The tax base was narrowed by a
firmly entrenched system in which employers provided nontaxable
fringe benefits, or "allowances," to their employees. While the Income
Tax Act clearly stated that such allowances were taxable, in practice,

no taxes were imposed on allowances. There were many different

types of allowances-housing, transportation, utilities, and entertainment were among the most popular-and these were paid largely in
cash with little verification of the actual individual expenditure. (c)
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Income earned from overtime activities received preferentia
ment. Overtime income was taxed at the lowest marginal tax
30% even if the individual's total income placed him or her in
marginal tax bracket. (d) Finally, the tax base was narrowed
sion. Evasion takes place by underreporting taxable income a
failure to file tax returns. Because of the PAYE withholding
it is believed that evasion is practiced primarily by the self-em
Unfortunately, the government of Jamaica maintains little
mation on the size of even the actual tax base. It has no information

on the magnitude of base erosion via tax credits, allowances, overtime,
underreporting, and nonfiling, and therefore cannot estimate the comprehensive income tax base. To make such an estimate we assembled
our own data from a variety of primary sources. The next section
discusses the methods used.

III. Estimating the Actual and the Potential Tax Base
The first step in measuring base erosion is to develop a profile of those
who do pay income taxes, describing the distribution of taxpayers by
bracket, the use of tax credits, taxes paid, and the like. To develop
such a profile, two random samples were drawn directly from Income

Tax Department (ITD) files. One sample is for those self-employed
who file tax returns, and the other is for PAYE taxpayers. Evidence
on avoidance and evasion was obtained from data in professional registries, business license records, and the telephone yellow pages, from
a special compensation survey carried out by the government, and
from the audit files of the ITD. Description of these data sets and the
results of analysis of each are presented in the following sections.
A. Actual Tax Base

The first sample is a random sample of 4,084 PAYE taxpayers dr
from employer income tax records for 1983. Because the actual
ber of PAYE taxpayers was unknown, this sample was weight
represent the population of PAYE taxpayers by forcing income
collections in the sample to equal actual PAYE income tax revenu
for 1983. By this method, the estimated population of PAYE taxp
was 277,712, a reasonable estimate according to Jamaican govern
officials. The distribution of taxpayers, regularly taxed income, in
claimed as overtime, tax credits, taxes paid, and average tax rate
the PAYE taxpayers is given in table 1.

We also drew a second, stratified random sample of 932 s

employed income tax returns for 1980.6 These sample returns w
first adjusted to represent the known population of 7,625 self-emp
taxpayers for that year. The returns were then adjusted to 1983 l
by increasing the number of taxpayers by 6% to approximate the
crease in the self-employed labor force over this period-with th
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TABLE 1

DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME AND TAXES

(Amounts in Thousands of Jama
PAYE TAXPAYERS

Taxes

Taxes

SELF-EMPLOYED TAXPAYERS Paid Pai
Regularly

on

on

Statutory Taxes Average Taxed Regular Overtime Overt

Tax Income Credits Paid Tax Tax Income Credits Income Income I

Returns (J$) (J$) (J$) Rate Returns (J$) (J$) (J$) (J$) (J$
00

Under J$2,000 1,208 -912.0 266.3 .0 .000 25,432 28,935.0 6,597.0 2,083.5 .0 .0
2,001-4,000 1,321 4,163.1 1,130.0 118.9 .025 43,044 132,490.0 31,120.5 8,626.5 .0 .0
4,001-6,000 1,453 7,133.0 1,485.4 681.5 .094 56,644 286,069.4 58,666.5 27,154.3 .0 .0

6,001-8,000 884 6,122.8 1,033.2 822.2 .133 48,416 331,263.3 59,999.9 40,142.1 1,650.6 495
8,001-10,000 613 5,389.9 707.5 1,019.7 .188 36,856 318,462.2 54,409.1 47,200.5 9,042.5 2,68
10,001-12,000 481 5,242.0 564.7 1,216.7 .232 27,676 291,821.7 44,642.0 53,698.4 10,869.8 3,25
12,001-14,000 350 4,532.5 389.3 1,247.0 .275 15,572 188,701.9 25,293.2 41,665.0 14,114.3 4,18
14,001-16,000 289 4,302.2 327.1 1,323.8 .307 7,684 106,269.8 11,966.1 27,898.5 8,929.2 2,65
16,001-18,000 184 3,089.4 205.4 1,047.4 .339 5,100 76,664.1 7,958.0 22,075.1 9,890.2 2,9
18,001-20,000 263 4,959.3 297.7 1,805.8 .364 4,148 72,929.7 6,226.5 23,965.0 6,122.7 1,8
20,001-25,000 315 7,032.3 420.0 2,725.9 .387 4,420 85,549.0 7,084.5 29,903.5 11,422.2 3,40
25,001-30,000 263 7,240.1 326.8 3,088.1 .426 1,428 35,282.0 1,792.0 14,551.1 3,631.1 1,0
30,001-50,000 359 13,147.5 457.8 6,079.6 .461 884 22,566.5 1,143.1 9,586.9 9,596.4 2,85
Over J$50,000 175 18,390.5 229.4 9,846.4 .522 408 17,510.3 486.9 8,607.5 11,430.8 3

Total 8,158 89,832.6 7,813.6 31,023.0 .345 277,712 1,994,514.9 317,385.3 357,157.9 96,699.8 28,841
SouRcE.--Computed from random samples of self-employed and PAYE tax returns.
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added taxpayers distributed across income classes according
1980 distribution-and by increasing the income of each taxpay
27% to capture the increase in nominal income over this perio
resulting 1983 population of self-employed taxpayers was 8,15

distribution of taxpayers, income, tax credits, taxes paid, and a
tax rate for the self-employed is given in table 1.
Table 1 indicates a substantially skewed distribution of inco
and taxes, both within and across sectors. Those PAYE taxpaye

earn less than J$10,000 account for over three-fourths of the taxpa

receive over half of total (regular plus overtime) PAYE income
pay one-third of total PAYE taxes (overtime income is discusse

more detail below). Only 1.0% of PAYE taxpayers earn mor
J$25,000. These taxpayers receive 4.8% of the income and pay

of the taxes in the PAYE sector. The distribution of income and taxes

is even more skewed in the self-employed sector. For this group,
67.2% of the taxpayers earn less than J$10,000; however, they receive
only 24.4% of total self-employed income and pay only 8.5% of selfemployed taxes. At the other end of the self-employed income distribution, those making more than J$25,000 number only 9.8% of the selfemployed, yet they earn 43.2% of the income and pay 61.3% of the
taxes.

The combined distribution for both self-employed and PAYE t
payers is shown in the last four columns of table 1. The self-emp
number only 2.9% of all taxpayers. Because of their higher avera
income (J$11,012 vs. J$7,530), they receive 4.1% of the income a
pay 7.4% of the taxes for all taxpayers. Clearly, however, the in

tax is dominated by PAYE taxpayers, and the characteristics o
taxpayers are dominated by those of the PAYE taxpayers. Table 1

figure 1 illustrate the implied progressivity of the income tax on stat

tory income. For the individual sectors and for the combined dis
bution of taxpayers, the average tax rate on statutory income ri
steadily as income increases, ranging from 0% to 52.2% for the
employed, from 6.9% to 40.0% for PAYE taxpayers, and from 6.6
to 43.7% for all taxpayers. However, as shown below, avoidance a
evasion activities seriously compromise this apparent progressivi
B. Tax Credits

These data allow us to estimate directly the extent to which the ta
base is reduced by the use of tax credits. For all taxpayers, credits
significantly erode revenues, reducing collections by J$325.2 million
an amount equivalent to nearly 80% of revenues actually collected.
However, credits also increase the progressivity of the income tax.
The presence of credits decreases tax burdens across all income brack

ets but lowers them by greater proportionate amounts in lowe

brackets.
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FIG. 1.-Income class (in thousands). Taxes paid as proportion

of statutory income;--------- - taxes paid as proportion of comprehensive
income; ....................-statutory income as proportion of comprehensive income; - - - - - taxes paid as proportion of taxes on comprehensive income;
and taxes on comprehensive income as proportion of comprehen-

sive income.

C. PA YE Overtime Income

In 1983 the government introduced preferential treatment of income
earned from overtime activities, in which all overtime income is subject to a 30% tax rate. Although overtime income is not reported by
the employer (or the employee), we were able to calculate the amount
of overtime using the sample of 4,084 PAYE taxpayers.
For 29% of the taxpayers in the PAYE sample, there was a discrepancy between the tax liability implied by income and credits, and

the tax actually paid; in nearly all cases the tax paid was less tha

the implied liability. We calculated for these taxpayers the amount of
overtime income necessary to result in the reported tax liability.' Th
resulting amounts of overtime income are shown in table 1. Total over
time income is J$96.7 million, or nearly 5% of total income for all
PAYE taxpayers; for those individuals receiving overtime income,

overtime is over 10% of total income.8

D. Undeclared Income by Nonfiling Self-employed Taxpayers
One is struck by the extent to which the income tax is a withholding
levy in most developing countries. Jamaica is no exception. Only 2.9%
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of all tax returns are from the self-employed, and the self-em
receive only 4.1% of total statutory income and pay only 9.5
taxes. These numbers suggest that evasion in the form of non
a widespread problem among this group. Estimation of the nu

self-employed individuals who do not file any tax return,

amount of income that escapes taxation as a result, requires a d
approach from those described above.
A master population list of names was assembled from va
third-party sources of information, including telephone dire
trade association lists, the Small Business Association of Jam

the Ministry of Health. Nine occupations were examined,

largely on the basis of advice from Jamaican tax experts on w
pations were important to and representative of the Jamaica

omy. These occupations were service stations, customs bro
auto repair, auto parts, hair care, real estate, contractors, tr
operators, and beverage and spirits outlets.9 In total, the ma
contained 29,838 entries for the period 1982-84. From this li
dom sample of approximately 40%, or 12,336 names, was drawn.
These names were taken to the ITD, and, with the assistance of their
personnel, an examination was made to determine whether these individuals had paid any income taxes, either by filing a tax return or by
having tax withheld. The search procedures were quite exhaustive and
thorough. We refer to this as the "self-employed sample of nonfilers."
The results are dramatic and indicate an enormous amount of

evasion among the self-employed. As shown in table 2, only 10.9%
individuals in the self-employed sample file a tax return; in no occup
tion does the filing rate exceed 13.3%.Io For those self-employed w
file tax returns, the average income is J$7,953, approximately the sa
as for all taxpayers; average credits and taxes paid for the filers ar
J$944 and J$2,019, respectively. The sample results on those who fi
returns were then used to estimate the total number of self-employ
individuals who do not file an income tax return, and the total inco
and taxes that thereby escape the tax net. In the absence of addition
information on the characteristics of nonfilers, we assumed that t
filing rate and characteristics of those in the sample and in the popu
tion of self-employed are the same. For 1983, the number of filers

445 from a sample of 4,113, for a filing rate of 10.8%." The tot

number of self-employed individuals in 1983 is determined by dividi

the number of self-employed tax returns in 1983 (or 8,158) by the filing

rate (or 10.8%). This procedure yields 75,402 self-employed individua
in 1983, with 8,158 filers and 67,244 nonfilers. The income, credits,
and taxes of the 67,224 nonfilers are estimated from the characterist
of those in the self-employed sample who filed tax returns. The amount

of undeclared income from this sample is estimated at nearly J$60
million. Clearly, the extent of evasion via nonfiling is enormous.
The results from the self-employed sample should be viewed wit
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TABLE 2
RESULTS FROM THE SELF-EMPLOYED SAMPLE
FILERS

SAMPLE POPULATION SAMPLE SIZE N %
Occupational sample:
Service

stations

630

252

14

5.6

Customs brokerages 366 147 4 2.7
Auto repair 888 318 31 9.7
Auto parts 402 158 13 8.2
Hair

care

Real

estate

2,280

919

105

Contractors

79

297

53

8

132

5.8

10.1
7

5.3

Transport 13,485 5,857 781 13.3
Beverage and spirits 11,385 4,474 430 9.6
Total

29,838

Professional

12,336

Accountants 384
Architects
75

Attorneys

Medical

373

doctors

10.9

Veterinarians

2,024

176 45 25.6
25
5
20.0

100

22

9

4

1,146

Optometrists
Total

1,341

sample:

37

225

9

37

572

43

10

129

22.0
19.1

44.4

27.0

22.6

SOURCE.--Computed

from

t

some caution. However,
als gave a similar, and s
clared income. This sam
used the same basic pro
population list of 2,024

tects, attorneys, med
From this list a random
names were taken to the ITD to determine whether these individuals

had paid any income taxes. We found that only 23% of these professionals paid any income taxes (see table 2); the implied base erosion
for the population of self-employed exceeds J$700 million.
In order to provide a lower boundary on the amount of evasion via
nonfiling, only the results from the self-employed sample are reported.

These estimates are given by income class in table 5, and the potential
revenues from taxation of the income-J$162 million-are reported in

table 6.

E. Underreported Income of Self-employed Taxpayers
Another form of tax evasion is the underreporting of income on the

tax returns of those individuals who file a tax return. Data limitations
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here are obviously quite severe. Nevertheless, there is enough
mation on underreporting to allow estimation of the determin
this underreporting. The approach we took here required tw
First, we used data from audited returns to estimate the deter
of underreporting. Second, we used a structural equation to i
total amount of underreporting to all self-employed taxpayer
In the process of collecting the self-employed sample of no
we discovered that many of those in the sample had been subj
an audit or an examination, which then led to a change in tax
Therefore, for these audited taxpayers, there is information
reported return items and on postaudit, or "true," return it
self-employed sample includes 440 audited tax returns for th
1982-84; 121 are for 1982, 187 are for 1983, and 132 are for 1984.
This information on audited taxpayers is not without weaknesses: it is
unlikely that auditors have detected all forms of underreported income
(or overclaimed tax credits), the sample provides no information on
those who do not file a tax return, underreporting may not always be
intentional, and there is no information on the probability of detection.

Still, these weaknesses are common with compliance data.12
It is possible to use this unique information to estimate the determinants of self-employed underreporting at the individual level. The
empirical specification is based on the extremely limited empirical liter-

ature on tax compliance.13 Two alternative measures of noncompliance
are used. The first is the log of the difference between the taxpayer's

reported income and the postaudit, or "true," level of income. The
second measure is the log of the difference between the taxpayer's
reported tax liability and the postaudit tax liability. For both measures,
the log transformation applies only to the nonzero cases.
Several explanatory variables are used. The first variable is the
marginal tax rate (MTR), measured to include both the income tax and
the numerous payroll taxes that are also imposed on statutory income.
In specifying MTR, postaudit income is used to determine the taxpayer's tax bracket. Since postaudit income is independent of the taxpayer's reporting decision, this approach makes the marginal tax rate
exogenous. One would expect that an increase in MTR would lead to
greater evasion because the reward for successful evasion is greater.
However, unless. one imposes restrictions on the degree of individual
risk aversion, the impact of MTR is ambiguous.
A second explanatory variable is income (INCOME), measured
as net-of-tax income. Income and taxes are calculated using their postaudit values, in order to ensure their exogeneity. As with MTR, the
expected impact of INCOME is ambiguous and depends on the individual's attitude toward risk. However, if evasion opportunities vary systematically and positively by income class, a positive income effect
will occur.

This content downloaded from
131.96.28.155 on Fri, 21 Oct 2022 20:31:02 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

J. Alm, R. Bahl, M. N. Murray 859
TABLE 3

ESTIMATION RESULTS: DETERMINANTS OF UNDERREPORTED INCOME AND TAXES
DEPENDENT VARIABLE

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE Underreported Income Underreported Taxes
MTR

2.05**

3.64**

(3.60)

(5.70)

INCOME 2.90 x 10-5** 4.7 x 10-5**
FAMILY

(3.70)

(5.40)

-.31

-.21

(1.50)

(.92)

CREDIT -3.30 x 10-4 -1.00 x 10-3
(.62)

(1.70)

CREDITSQ 2.10 x 10-7 2.60 x 10-7
(1.40)

DMALE

.08

(1.50)

-

.02

(.90)

DTRANSPORT

DOTHER

.18**

(.16)

.24**

(2.70)

(3.20)

(1.90)

(1.40)

.23*

.19

SouRcE.-Computed from the selfNoTE.-Coefficient estimates with
* Significant at .10 level.
** Significant at .01 level.

A

family

size

variable

is

inc

tax credit information, that se
ences in taxpayer heterogeneit
is also included to control furth
entered to reflect credit usage

to

control

nally,

The

two

for

nonlinearities,

dummy

reference

variables

sector

is

are

bever

sents those who work in the tr
those in all other sectors. Sinc
values for both measures of no
technique is the Tobit maximu
Estimation results are report
are the coefficients on MTR an
marginal tax rate has a positive
pact on evasion. Similarly, the
and statistically significant at
to changes in these variables ar
(evaluated at the means) are ge
The results for the other var
ables for sector of employmen
transport and other sectors eva
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spirits sector. The coefficients on CREDIT, CREDITSQ, and
are never statistically significant.
These estimation results are used to predict the expected

of underreported income for the 8,158 self-employed taxpayers in

The predicted amount of underreported income equals J$112
in 1983, as shown in table 5, and the implied tax loss exce
million (about 15% of actual collections), as shown in table 6.
these results should be taken as rough orders of magnitude. H
estimation from a second sample of data gave similar estimate
F. Allowances of PA YE Taxpayers

PAYE employees receive compensation in two basic forms

wages/salaries, and allowances, which are in principle subject
tion but which in practice are not taxed. Allowances are cash

ments that may be given for a variety of purposes: housing, trave

entertainment, bonus and profit sharing, utilities, meals, comm
education, laundry, and uniforms. Because allowances are not
and monitoring is minimal, employees have a strong incentive
stitute allowances for wages. Employers are not required to r
employee allowances to the ITD. Fortunately, we had access to
mation on these fringe benefits, drawn expressly for the tax
project.
In 1984 the Revenue Board of the government of Jamaica requested that all public and private sector employers provide detailed
information on taxable and nontaxable compensation paid to their em-

ployees. In total, 1,345 firms with 70,155 employees responded;
roughly half of the workers were in the public sector. Although the

Revenue Board survey is not a random sample, the survey covers

approximately 25% of the formal PAYE labor force in Jamaica, and
the distribution of taxpayers and their characteristics are similar to
that produced by the random samples reported in table 1.
Average cash compensation of employees in the Revenue Board
survey is J$8,132, and average allowance compensation is J$1,170. The
proportion of allowances in total (cash plus allowance) compensation
is .126. The most commonly used allowances are for housing, travel,
and entertainment. There is considerable variation in the use of allow-

ances, both within and across income classes. Individuals in the lowest
income class receive on average only J$74 in allowances; those in the
top class receive J$17,273 in allowances. However, there is a tendency
for allowances to fall as a percentage of income as income rises above
J$20,000.
Data for the Revenue Board survey can be used to estimate the
determinants of the share of allowances in total compensation.16 The
dependent variable is the share of total net-of-tax compensation received in allowances. Several independent variables are used. The
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TABLE 4

ESTIMATION RESULTS: DETERMINANTS OF ALLOWANCE SHARE

Independent Variable Dependent Variable: Allowance Share

[1-MTR]
INCOME

-.16*

-2.00

DPRIVATE

x

(43.22)
10-3*
(15.06)

.09*

(178.83)
[MTR*DPRIVATE] - .07*
(43.40)

R2

.18

SouRcE.--Co
NOTE.--Coef
*
Significant

marginal

stitute

ta

allo

off
to
nont
(1
MTR)
b
wages.
Net
dependent
v
lated
using
exogeneity.
sector
and
tor
compan
than
public
is
also
inclu
The
estima
the
price
o
significant.
ance
compe
tive.
Work
shares
than
These
estim
ances
for
e
of
allowanc
tax
revenue
6.
In
total,

11.3%;

the

collected.

T

IV. Effects of Base Erosion

Estimates of the actual and the potential tax base are summarized i
table 5; actual and potential tax revenues are in table 6. Consider firs
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TABLE 5

ACTUAL AND POTENTIAL TAX BASE

(Amounts in Thousands of Jamaican Dollars
Undeclared

Income of Underrep
Fully Taxed Income Overtime Nonf
of Self-employed Income of Self-employed Self-emp
and PAYE Taxpayers* PAYE Taxpayers Individuals Ta

00

0

Under 2,000 28,023.0 .0 2,585.3 .0
2,001-4,000 136,653.1 .0 45,508.2 .0
4,001-6,000 293,202.4 .0 70,744.2 1,775.
6,001-8,000 337,386.1 1,650.6 79,868.3 10,53
8,001-10,000 323.852.0 9,042.5 44,065.4 10,33
10,001-12,000 297,063.6 10,869.8 82,593.8 18,7
12,001-14,000 193,234.4 14,114.3 48,940.6 13,4
14,001-16,000 110,572.0 8,929.2 22,697.5 7,58
16,001-18,000 79,753.5 9,890.2 26,270.4 5,40
18,001-20,000 77,889.1 6,122.7 20,572.8 3,92
20,001-25,000 92,581.3 11,422.2 24,007.6 7,14
25,001-30,000 42,522.1 3,631.1 21,530.8 4,7
30,001-50,000 35,713.9 9,596.4 29,436.4 10,
Over 50,000 35,900.9 11,430.8 64,941.8 17,6

Total 2,084,347.4 96,699.8 583,763.2 112,321.

SouRcE.-Computed from the random samp
Board Survey of allowances.
* Fully taxed income equals the sum of sel
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TABLE 6

ACTUAL AND POTENTIAL TAX REV

(Amounts in Thousands of Jamaican
Taxes on

Added Undeclared Taxes

Taxes from Income of

Taxes Paid by Full Taxation Nonfiling

Self-employed and of PAYE Self-em

PAYE Taxpayers Overtime Income Individuals Ta

00
WO

Under 2,000 2,083.5 .0 .0 .0
2,001-4,000 8,745.4 .0 1,597.5 .0
4,001-6,000 27,835.9 .0 5,921.1 646
6,001-8,000 41,459.5 165.0 14,271.4 3,1
8,001-10,000 50,909.0 904.3 10,193.0 3,70
10,001-12,000 58,170.9 1,403.7 22,240.2 7,60
12,001-14,000 47,098.6 2,233.7 14,872.0 5,6
14,001-16,000 31,876.9 1,820.8 7,715.1 2,8
16,001-18,000 26,061.3 2,261.7 9,659.4 2,9
18,001-20,000 27,607.6 1,605.1 7,709.2 2,4
20,001-25,000 36,039.1 2,763.8 10,034.8 3,7
25,001-30,000 18,728.7 872.7 9,476.1 2,5
30,001-50,000 18,523.3 2,387.4 14,080.3 5,
Over 50,000 21,883.1 2,954.8 34,168.9 9,6

Total 417,022.8 19,373.0 161,938.9 50,689

SouRcE.--Computed from the random samples of self-emp
Board Survey of allowances.
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the amount of income that escapes the income tax net. As s
table 5, this amount is enormous. Fully taxed income of selfand PAYE taxpayers in 1983 is J$2,084.3 million; total compr

income is more than J$1 billion greater, or J$3,123.7 million. The

tax base is only two-thirds of its potential. Even this figure,
understates the extent of base erosion because it does not count base
reduction due to tax credits.

The major source of base erosion is the failure of many selfemployed individuals to file any tax return. Nonfiling shrinks the tax
base by J$583.8 million, or by 56.2% of the total reduction of J$1,039.4
million. Also of considerable importance is the receipt of allowances
in lieu of cash compensation; this practice reduces the base of J$246.6
million, or by 23.7% of the total reduction. Underreported income and
overtime income in total reduce the potential tax base by J$209.0 million (20.1% of the total reduction).
The distribution of base erosion across income classes is quite
varied. Fully taxed income as a proportion of comprehensive income
falls somewhat steadily as income rises (see fig. 1). For those whose
income is less than J$10,000, this ratio is roughly three-quarters. However, for those in higher-income classes, this ratio is considerably less
and reaches .262 for those whose income is more than J$50,000. The
major erosion in the tax base is due to tax evasion, a practice that is
more common and more accessible to those who are self-employed.
Hidden in the estimates of comprehensive income is substantial
variation within income classes in the proportion of income that is fully

taxed. For individuals in the PAYE sector, the bulk of their income is
fully taxed; however, individuals with equal comprehensive income
who are self-employed are better able to pursue evasion via nonfiling
and underreporting. Noncompliance therefore introduces horizontal
inequities into the tax system, inequities that may further discourage
voluntary compliance.
Failure to tax comprehensive income reduces tax collections by
a substantial amount. As shown in table 6, potential taxes-those that
might be collected on a comprehensive income base-are J$766.0 mil-

lion; taxes actually collected are J$417.0 million, or only 54.4% of
potential revenues. Failure to tax comprehensive income therefore

leads to a revenue loss of J$349.0 million, or 83.7% of the taxes actually
generated in 1983. Recall also that tax credits cost another J$325.2
million in tax revenues. The total revenue erosion therefore exceeds

J$674 million, an amount equivalent to 1.6 times the amount actually
collected.

Aside from credits, the bulk of the forgone tax revenues stems
from evasion by self-employed. Nonfiling generates a revenue loss of
J$161.9 million, and underreporting reduces revenues by J$50.7 million. The receipt of compensation in allowances lowers revenues by
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J$116.9 million, and the preferential trea
leads to a J$19.4 million loss.

Given the pattern of base erosion acros
nominal progressive rate structure of the
revenue loss can be seen as a transfer to h
Taxes actually paid as a proportion of taxe
fall steadily as income rises (see fig. 1). Fo
less than J$10,000, this ratio always exceed

than J$20,000, the ratio is roughly .5, and fa

classes. Of the J$349 million in forgone
from those with an income of less than J
revenue loss comes from those with an inc
even though this group receives only 10%
and only 15% of total comprehensive inco
Because comprehensive income is not ta
actual tax burden in relation to statutory,
a very misleading picture of the true inci
the average tax rate is calculated by divid

income, then the income tax appears to

average tax rate on statutory income is 6.
class, and rises steadily to 43.7% on those e
(these rates are given in table 1 and fig. 1
tax rate is calculated by dividing taxes paid
a very different picture emerges. As shown
rate rises somewhat as income initially rise
for the top income classes. The income tax
apparently progressive tax to one that is
Again, the reduction in the progressivity

evasion is the main avenue of noncompl

often used by higher-income, self-employ
of comprehensive income would significan
even allowing for adverse behavioral respo
tion of comprehensive income would resto
sivity of the individual income tax. As sho
taxes on comprehensive income to compre
ily and steeply with income. More import
panded base would allow significant rate re
enues. Such rate reductions would dampen
distortive effects of high marginal tax rate

V. Comparison with a "Gap Approach"
It is possible to obtain estimates of base

method, called a "gap approach." The ga

data from the national income accounts or
mate the amount of base erosion and the c
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This method is more easily applied than our micro-level m
so is more commonly used in fiscal analysis.20 An interest
is whether the gap approach gives the same results as thos
suggested methodology.
The most common gap estimation method compares co
tion reported on tax returns with that shown in the nat
accounts. The national income accounts indicate that in 1983 the total

compensation of Jamaican employees was J$3,935 million, while total
statutory income for all taxpayers in the samples here is J$2,181 million. The gap between total compensation and reported income is
therefore J$1,754 million. If this amount were taxed at the average
rate for all taxpayers currently in the system (or 19.1%), then forgone
revenues from base erosion would equal J$335 million. This estimate
is close to the amount estimated using the micro approach developed
here (J$349 million), which suggests that the national income gap approach may give a reasonable first approximation to base erosion.

The gap approach, however, can never be more than a general

statement of the dimensions of the problem. There are other, powerful
arguments in favor of the micro approach. First, the micro approach
allows analysis of the components of tax base erosion, such as underreporting versus nonfiling versus legal avoidance. This is important
evidence that can help policymakers determine whether the biggest
return lies in investment in improved auditing to capture underreporters, an information system to identify nonfilers, or a structural reform

in the tax code to eliminate loopholes. Second, micro estimates provide information on the distribution of taxpayers, evaders, and their
incomes, across sectors and across income brackets. This enables us
to estimate the tax loss under the actual tax law (vs. an assumed
average rate), as well as the vertical and horizontal equity implications
of erosion. Finally, micro estimates allow the estimation of individual
behavioral responses to tax rate changes. Of course, these advantages
are not costless. The effort necessary to estimate base erosion at the
individual level is substantial and lengthy, while the sole virtue of the
gap measures is their simplicity. Still, the benefits of having individual
measures of avoidance and evasion may be well worth the cost. In the
case of Jamaica, these measures played a central role in the tax reform
process.

VI. Summary and Conclusions
It is perhaps not surprising that erosion of the individual income tax
base lowers both the revenues and the progressivity of the tax. However, the extent of these effects is striking. Avoidance and evasion of
the income tax have cost the government of Jamaica enormous
amounts of revenues, equal to 84% of actual collections. The equity

This content downloaded from
131.96.28.155 on Fri, 21 Oct 2022 20:31:02 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

J. Aim, R. Bahl, M. N. Murray 867

cost of evasion and avoidance is no less str
gressive Jamaican income tax has been con

whelmingly a tax on low- to moderate-

sector of the economy. Horizontal equity
The rate of compliance, and therefore the
dramatically depending on whether a work
sector, PAYE or self-employed. This varia
and within income classes likely has reinfo
ance through taxpayer attitudes. Noncomp
resource allocation distortions introduced b
dramatic differences in effective tax rates
and income classes are likely to have signi
choices. Moreover, the narrow base that is
marginal tax rate, which discourages savin
effort, while leading to capital (and human
bly best made by noting that, if Jamaica t
instead of statutory income, the same rev
an average effective tax rate of only 13%,
rate. Clearly, tax base erosion has seriously
goals of the Jamaican income tax.
It must be stressed that these estimates
orders of magnitude. As we have indicated
stantial difficulties in measuring erosion.
estimates assume no behavioral changes in
rate changes, that is, they are "impact" es
the level and distribution of "comprehensi
when the tax system is changed. Another i
measure some forms of erosion, such as in
(drugs, e.g.). The potential tax base is al
estimates.

The methods that we used are clearly specific to Jamaica and its
institutions. However, these or similar methods are feasible in many
other developing countries. The major form of erosion in developing
countries is likely to be nonfiling of tax returns, and our procedures
for identifying the hard to tax can be easily adapted elsewhere. The
major forms of avoidance are apt to be the use of credits or deductions
and the receipt of nontaxed fringe benefits; again, access to individual
and employer tax records makes estimation of both forms of erosion
feasible. Other countries will face different forms of erosion. Still, our
procedures demonstrate that, despite apparent obstacles, the magni-

tudes of these forms of erosion can be estimated.

Estimates of the actual and the potential tax base are essential to
tax policy discussion. In Jamaica, over 200 rate and base combinations
of the income tax were analyzed before a final reform structure was
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chosen. It is unlikely that so sweeping a reform could have o
without these simulations, since the empirical work demonstr
tures of the tax system that were either unknown or hidden.
Of more importance, perhaps, is what governments can d
reduce base erosion. Our analysis suggests two major lessons
ernment policy. First, incentives matter, and the tax base w
increase systematically and predictably to reductions in mar
rates. The estimation results for allowances and underreportin
onstrate directly the potential impact of rate reduction; it see
that other forms of erosion will respond in the same way. S
central component of tax policy and tax reform in all develop
tries should involve administrative improvements that attack
by self-employed individuals: establishing a complete tax rol
self-employed, assigning taxpayer identification numbers, de
methods for low-cost assessment, and training income tax p
To the extent the largest source of base erosion arises from ad
tive weaknesses that allow nonfiling, such administrative im
ments are likely to have a more immediate and more productiv
on the tax base than, say, training of auditors.21
The tax reform in Jamaica implemented these tax rate and
istrative changes. Although it is too soon to assess their lasting
initial evidence suggests that these changes will allow the in
income tax in Jamaica to achieve more closely its distributio
revenue goals. More generally, tax base erosion is a complicated,
multistage process. There are many opportunities that an individual

can pursue, and all must be considered-and, more important,
quantified-in formulating strategies to combat erosion.
Notes

1. A good discussion of the administrative dimension of base erosion is
in Richard M. Bird, "The Administrative Dimension of Tax Reform in Developing Countries," in Tax Reform in Developing Countries, ed. Malcolm Gillis
(Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1989), pp. 315-46; and Charles E.
McLure, Jr., John Mutti, Victor Thuronyi, and George R. Zodrow, The Taxation of Income from Business and Capital in Colombia (Bogota: Direcci6n
General de Impuestos Nacionales, 1988). For case studies in developing countries, see Federico J. Herschel, "Taxation of Agriculture and Hard-to-Tax
Groups," in Fiscal Reform for Colombia, ed. Richard Musgrave and Malcolm
Gillis (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Law School, International Tax Program,
1971), pp. 387-415, and "Tax Evasion and Its Measurement in Developing
Countries," Public Finance 33 (1978): 232-66; Daniel M. Holland, "Measuring
and Combating Tax Evasion," in Proceedings of the 38th Congress of the
International Society of Public Finance, Copenhagen (Detroit: Wayne State
University Press, 1982); and National Tax Research Center, "A Study on
Tax Administration and Compliance," Republic of the Philippines, National
Economic Development Authority, 1986.
2. Some country studies have attempted to quantify noncompliance (e.g.,
for the Philippines, National Tax Research Center, "A Study on Tax Adminis-
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tration and Compliance"; for Argentina and C
of Agriculture and Hard-to-Tax Groups"), but
developing country makes such estimates on a
and critique of the approaches to measuring i
Richupan, "Determinants of Income Tax Evasi
ed. Ved Gandhi (Washington, D.C.: Internation

140-74.

3. We confine our analysis of illegal base erosion to income tax nonfiling
and underreporting as it relates to legal source income. The broader focus on
illegal source income and the underground economy is beyond the scope of
this article. Estimation of the size of the underground economy is discussed in
Vito Tanzi, ed., The Underground Economy in the United States and Abroad
(Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1982).
4. The exchange rate between Jamaican and U.S. dollars was 1.93 in
1983, 3.94 in 1984, and 5.56 in 1985.
5. The tax rate schedule prior to reform was:
Income Tax Rate

Under J$7,000
7,000-10,000
10,001-12,000
12,001-14,000
Over J$14,000

.30
.40
.45
.50
.575

At 1983 exchange rates, the 30% bracket applied to the first U

income, and the 57.5% bracket began at US$7,254. Per capita Jamai
in 1983 was US$1,614.
6. The sample was drawn in the summer of 1983, and 1980 wa
because it was feared that lags in filing would lead to incomplete
more recent years were selected.
7. For example, a taxpayer with income of J$10,000 and credits
has an implied tax liability of J$1,300 (or J$3,300-J$2,000). If taxe
paid via employer withholding are only J$1,100, then there is impute
of J$2,000, since the tax liability on J$8,000 of regularly taxed i
J$2,000 of overtime income is J$1,100 (or just J$3,100-J$2,000).
8. There is some doubt that what we have calculated as "overtime in-

come" is in fact compensation for true overtime activities, given the observed
distribution by income class and the nature of the Jamaican economy. Government officials have identified several possible explanations for the discrepan-

cies: random error, business expenses of salespeople, and outright PAYE

evasion. We and the government personnel with whom we worked concluded
that the most likely reason for the discrepancies was evasion. Note, however,
that the magnitude of the tax discrepancies and their impact on revenue loss
are unaffected by the true reason for their existences. We have chosen to
attribute the discrepancies to overtime simply for expositional convenience.

The issue is explored at length in James Aim, Roy Bahl, and Matthew N.
Murray, "Tax Structure and Tax Compliance," Review of Economics and
Statistics 72, no. 4 (November 1990): 603-13.

9. The Ministry of Health was extremely helpful in identifying barbers
and beauticians, since these individuals must be registered with the government. The Inland Revenue Department also facilitated the identification of
beverage and spirit outlet operators.
10. In fact, the classification procedures were somewhat more complex.
Seven categories of filing status were identified: (1) A return was located, and
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relevant data were recorded. (2) No taxpayer reference number coul
cated but neither a file nor a charge-out card (i.e., a record indicati
return had been taken from the file by ITD personnel) could be locat
taxpayer file was found, but no return was present. (5) A taxpayer
charged out and could not be located. (6) Two taxpayers had the same t
reference number. (7) The taxpayer was not liable for a return. File
identified as category 1, and all other categories were classified as no
This procedure may lead to some overestimate of the extent of non
However, any upward bias is small, since categories 2 and 4 are clearly
ers, and these two categories account for 9,943, or 90 percent, of the
non-category-1 classifications.
11. The self-employed sample covered the period 1982 to 1984. Ap
mately 4,100 names were drawn each year of the sample. Results for t
self-employed sample were used in order to make comparable the info
across the various samples.
12. For example, see the discussion of U.S. data by Charles T. Clotf
"Tax Evasion and Tax Rates: An Analysis of Individual Returns," Rev
Economics and Statistics 65 (1983): 363-73.
13. Only Clotfelter has had access to direct, individual measures
evasion, obtained from the U.S. Internal Revenue Service Taxpayer C
ance Measurement Program (TCMP). Virtually all other empirical wo
compliance has been for the United States and has used TCMP data f
aggregated to the three-digit zip code level. See, e.g., Ann D. Witte an
F. Woodbury, "The Effect of Tax Laws and Tax Administration on Tax
pliance: The Case of the U.S. Individual Income Tax," National Tax Jo

38 (1985): 1-13; and Jeffrey A. Dubin and Louis L. Wilde, "An Em

Analysis of Federal Income Tax Auditing and Compliance," National Tax
Journal 41 (1988): 61-74.

14. Results for the constant and for dummy variables for the year in which

the audit or examination took place are omitted for brevity. The full set of
results is available on request.
15. The second sample also consists of audited tax returns from the ITD.
This "tax audit sample" includes 148 audited returns for 1980-82, with 67, 56,
and 25 returns from the respective years. Unfortunately, the same information

was not recorded for the two samples. For the tax audit sample, all pre- and
postaudit tax return entries were recorded, including detailed information on
types of income and credits. For the self-employed sample, all preaudit information was recorded, but the only postaudit data recorded were corrected
income and tax liabilities. In addition, the self-employed sample consists of
examinations, while the tax audit sample comprises exclusively more detailed
line-by-line audits. Consequently the two samples were not combined in estimation. Nevertheless, we also used the tax audit sample to estimate the determinants of underreporting. The Tobit maximum likelihood estimation results
are:

DEPENDENT VARIABLE

INDEPENDENT Underreported Underreported
VARIABLE

MTR

Income Taxes
2.03
4.58

(2.94)

(6.01)

INCOME 2.0 x 10-5 4.6 x 10-5
(1.23)

FAMILY

-

.05

(1.40)

(2.80)

-

.09

(2.23)
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DEPENDENT VARIABLE

INDEPENDENT Underreported Underreported
VARIABLE Income Taxes
BENEFIT
-6.08
4.10

(1.62)

DWAGE

-

DIVIDEND
DRENT

-

.66

(1.51)

(2.29)

(3.05)

(2.64)

-

-

(1.04)

.44

1.84

.40

-1.18

-

(1.40)

.10

(.37),

where the dependent varia
FAMILY are defined as in
from the various payroll p
DWAGE, DIVIDEND, and DRENT are dummy variables that indicate the
presence of wage, dividend, or rental income, respectively; and asymptotic
t-statistics are in parentheses. The responses of evasion to changes in these
variables are generally similar to those in the self-employed sample.
16. There is a large empirical literature on the determinants of compensation choice, at least for the United States. See, e.g., Witte and Woodbury;
and James E. Long and Frank A. Scott, "The Income Tax and Nonwage
Compensation," Review of Economics and Statistics 65 (1982): 211-19. The
specification here is based on their work.
17. Results for the constant and for dummy variables for income classes
are omitted. The full set of results is available on request.
18. In 1984 Peat, Marwick, and Partners (PMP) surveyed 25 different job
classifications in 18 public and private sector companies for the government
of Jamaica. In all, 265 positions were surveyed. The PMP survey generated
detailed information on the amount and the composition of employee compensation. Average wages are J$26,086, and average allowances are J$22,949, so
that allowances average 46.8% of total compensation. The most common and
the largest allowances are for housing and cars, followed by entertainment,
bonus, and travel. This information was used to estimate the determinants of

the allowance share. The estimation results are:

ALLOWANCE = .73 - .84 x (1-MTR) + 7.97 x 10-6 x INCOME
(6.58) (- 3.85) (5.26)
+ .05 x DPRIVATE

(1.84)

R2 = .23, F = 26.86,
where ALLOWANCE is the share of allowances in total compensation, other
variables are defined in the text, and t-statistics are in parentheses. Use of this
equation to estimate total allowances for all PAYE employees indicates that
allowances are J$258.0 million. Although PMP believes the PMP survey information to be very accurate, there is reason to question whether the information

is representative of compensation practices in the entire Jamaican economy.
The survey was small and was not randomly drawn, the companies selected
were those that had dealt previously with PMP, and the positions selected
were predominantly upper-level job classifications. The potential bias from the
sampling procedure is shown most clearly by comarring the high average
wage in the PMP survey (J$26,086) with the average wage of PAYE workers
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(J$7,630). Therefore, in our analysis, we used results from the R
Survey. Still, the level of estimated allowances is nearly the same
surveys.

19. An alternative is the currency-based gap approach. For a discussion
of this methodology, see Tanzi, ed. (n. 3 above).

20. See, e.g., R. K. Datta, "The Parallel Economy in India," Indian

Economic Journal 3 (1983): 19-54; and Herschel, "Tax Evasion and Its Measurement in Developing Countries" (see n. 1 above).

21. Where the problem is underreporting, investment in improved

auditing can pay substantial returns. Malcolm Gillis, "Comprehensive Tax
Reform: The Indonesian Experience, 1981-1988," in Gillis, ed. (n. 1 above),

p. 108, gives the example of Indonesia where a special audit strike force

brought in returns that were 340 times the investment. See also the discussion
of tax administration in Bird (n. 1 above); and McLure et al. (n. 1 above).
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Harvard University

This book addresses the role of knowledge in
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